On the good news in equity carve-outs
Article Abstract:
The announcement of the sale of equity in a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation is received by the market as good news about the value of the existing equity in the parent corporation. This is in stark contrast to announcements of other forms of public equity financing. We show that the apparent inconsistency between the market response to equity carve-out announcements and other forms of equity financing can be easily understood in the Myers and Majluf (1984) framework. It is shown that firms that resort to an equity carve-out will be firms that, on the average, are being undervalued by the market. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Journal of Finance
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0022-1082
Year: 1991
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Stock splits, volatility increases, and implied volatilities
Article Abstract:
A test of the efficiency of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, relative to post-split increases in the volatility of common stocks, is presented. The Black-Scholes and Roll option pricing formulas are used to examine the behavior of implied standard deviations (ISDs) around split announcement and ex-dates. Comparisons with a control group of stocks find no relative increase in ISDs of stocks announcing splits. However, a relative increase is detected at the ex-date. Therefore, the joint hypothesis that (1) the Black-Scholes and Roll formulas are true and (2) the CBOE is efficient can be rejected. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Journal of Finance
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0022-1082
Year: 1989
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Stock prices and the supply of information
Article Abstract:
We develop a model in which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price provides an incentive for brokers to produce research reports on firms with low share prices. Stock splits therefore affect the attention paid to a firm by investment analysts. Managers with favorable private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm's shares in order to reveal the information to investors. We find empirical evidence that is consistent with the major new prediction of the model, that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely related to its share price. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
Publication Name: Journal of Finance
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0022-1082
Year: 1991
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