The Association Between Bank Performance, Board Independence, and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity

Article Abstract:

Keywords: Incentives, CEO Compensation, Holding Companies We investigate the extent to which incentive alignment through CEO compensation contracts is employed by boards of large bank holding companies. A substitution-monitoring hypothesis is proposed. Of special interest is the issue of board independence as it relates to outside directors. Our results indicate that the internal monitoring which is supplied by the board is generally effective. However, when financial performance is poor, independent boards make greater use of compensation contracts to align the financial interests of managers and shareholders.

Finance

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The determinants of foreign bank involvement in U.S. banking markets

Article Abstract:

The determining factors for foreign bank involvement in the US bank market are presented. Loan-deposit spreads, exchange values, and size of the foreign bank markets are some of the determinants.

Commercial Banks, Commercial Banking, Statistical Data Included, Banking industry, Market share, Foreign banks

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