A market to implement the core

Article Abstract:

A system is derived using a non-cooperative game whose result is consonant to cooperative solutions as required by the core. This is done as a means of putting to practical use the concept of the core as a fixed set of allocations that cannot be improved upon. The mechanism is similar to an asset market populated by brokers who seek to monopolize information to maximize profit. In this market, equilibrium is achieved solely through core allocations.

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Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game

Article Abstract:

Dynamic evolutionary stability can be attained in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game characterized by finite repetitions and cumulative payoffs. The theory requires both players to choose between two alternatives, cooperate or defect, throughout the game. While the theory is applicable to repetitive games with an existing dominant strategy, its application can be extended to altered games where cooperative behavior have set in among the players.

Analysis, Usage, Equilibrium (Economics), Prisoner's dilemma game

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