Cooperation for pennies: a note on epsilon-equilibria

Article Abstract:

Epsilon-equilibria can often sustain full cooperation up to very near the end of the horizon in finitely repeated smooth games, with very minimal amounts of irrationality. A simple example of the oligopoly model considered by Radner, who advanced the epsilon-equilibria approach, is examined to illustrate how powerful the method is. It is shown that epsilon-equilibria can support complete cooperation worth $20,000 until the fifth period before the end of the horizon. Behavior is moreover shown to be highly insensitive to the amount of irrationality even near the end of the horizon.

Models, Games of strategy (Mathematics)

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Coordination and weak announcement proofness: two comments on "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria."((article by Matthews, S.A., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and Postlewaite, A. in vol. 55 of Journal of Economic Theory, p.247))

Article Abstract:

A re-examination of the 'weak announcement proofness' criterion formulated by Steven Matthews and others is presented. The re-examination shows that this criterion is not always weaker than announcement proofness and in the class of simple sender-receiver games. Matthews et al.'s weak announcement proofness concept, as suggested by the first result, may require a new name. The name 'equilibrium-announcement proofness' is appropriate since an extra condition, C3A, is added, making strong credibility seem stronger than credibility.

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Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games

Article Abstract:

The author shows the relationship between lack of cooperation and slowness of learning.

United States, Science & research, Usage, Learning, Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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