Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be compensated?
Corruption may arise when enforcement of the law is delegated by the principal to other agents. In the case of pollution control enforcement, economic theory suggests that inspectors may be bribed unless their compensation is higher than any possible offer from offenders. However, closer analysis of the relationship between enforcement effort, pollution and corruption using a utilitarian approach shows that unexpected effects may be obtained in changing compensation policy. Nevertheless, bribery is shown to be inefficient and must be eliminated.
Publication Name: Economic Journal
How Should Commodities Be Taxed?
The methods of taxing commodities is examined to determine the optimum balance between direct and indirect taxes. The form of taxation affects market structure, product quality, and variety. Harmonization of taxing policy is important to European Economic Community (EEC) countries.
Publication Name: European Economic Review
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