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Cross holdings in Germany

Article Abstract:

There is little data available on the structure of ownership and control in German companies. This is linked to the network of cross-ownership involving insurers and banks, and their aim of disguising the extent to which power is concentrated. Concentration of power has an adverse effect on competition. A small group of managers seeks to protect its position of power, which is derived from stockholdings that are widely spread, and voting rights being pooled in the case of nominee stockholders.

Author: Adams, Michael, Nyborg, Kjell G., Van Hulle, Cynthia
Publisher: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Germany)
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1999
Germany

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Corporate finance and corporate control: an empirical research agenda

Article Abstract:

Nine papers have been presented at the 'Corporate Finance and Corporate Control' seminar of the New Institutional Economics in Germany, three being descriptive and six theoretical. Empirical research is another element which may be neglected, and models may assume that there is empirical accuracy for key parameters. There are a number of questions relating to empirical research which deserve to be investigated and they include disagreements among stockholders.

Author: Karpoff, Jonathan M.
Publisher: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Germany)
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1999
Analysis, Empiricism

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Monitoring and consulting by an imperfect supervisor

Article Abstract:

Supervisory boards are intended to monitor management, set the pay levels of managers and take part in decision making. Board members may not have independence from managers, and this means that they may not act in stockholders' interests. They may also not hold enough meetings, or see themselves as representing stockholders, but rather the company and its interests. There may still be benefits arising from supervision, even if it is imperfect.

Author: Nippel, Peter, Terberger-Stoy, Eva
Publisher: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Germany)
Publication Name: Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0932-4569
Year: 1999
Corporate directors

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Subjects list: Management, Corporate governance, Economic aspects
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