Delay and settlement in litigation
An empirical analysis of predictions about the factors that could affect litigants' settlement decisions over time is presented. The predictions are derived from Spier's (1992) dynamic model of pre-trial negotiation. Results indicate that settlement delay is increased when the litigants contend with low costs of bargaining, when the defendant thinks that is not liable, and when the estimated damages are high. Results also indicate that Spier's strategic model can explain a number of important characteristics of pre-trial bargaining.
Publication Name: Economic Journal
Using higher moments to estimate the simple errors-in-variables model
The standard simple regression model provides the ability to test the identification of parameters via the existence of independent variables which are normally distributed. The formula minimum-x2 could provide the approximation value of the identified parameters with the utilization of up to the fourth moments. The number of parameters and number of moment conditions increases more rapidly than explanatory variables.
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
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