Imperfect monitoring in communication networks
Article Abstract:
Development of empirical model for efficient monitoring of communications networks (star networks), based on uncertainty of efficient management of information by individuals, is described.Applicability of this model in management of social networks is discussed.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2006
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Networks and farsighted stability
Article Abstract:
The study provides a new framework for the analysis of and demonstrates the existence of farsighted consistent directed networks. The framework extends the standard notion of a network and also introduces the notion of a supernetwork.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2005
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Wealth inequality and dynamic stability
Article Abstract:
The link between wealth inequality and stability in a two-sector neoclassical growth model heterogeneous agent is explored and the results are presented.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2005
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: On aggregation of information in competitive markets: the dynamic case. Market efficiency and inefficiency in rational expectations equilibria: dynamic effect of heterogenous information and noise
- Abstracts: Lump-sum payments and profit-sharing plans in the union sector of the United States economy. Are rising earnings profiles a forced-saving mechanism?
- Abstracts: Technology adoption with finite horizons. Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics. An integral index for measuring aversion to large-scale risks
- Abstracts: Rational-choice hermeneutics. Rethinking invention: cognition and the economics of technological creativity
- Abstracts: Learning of equilibria by a population with minimal information. Migration and the evolution of conventions