Abstracts » Economics

Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity

Article Abstract:

The information structure, which can be classified as either probabilistic or partitional, is a crucial factor in determining the allocation rules that can be implemented. Examples of settings wherein partitional information complicates information are provided, challenging existing results which indicate that partitional information simplifies implementation problems in relation to what can be accomplished under probabilistic information. Agents may find it easier to coordinate their behavior when they have partitional information in constrained capacity settings.

Data structures

---

A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings

Article Abstract:

The principal-agent model where moral hazard exists is discussed in relation to the solution of the problem of tacit conclusions in a manner that is less rigid than that proposed by Nash. Second-best solutions are extracted and approximated from a simple structure that is created to simulate the iterative elimination of strategies characterized by rigidly dominated strategies.

Models, Forecasting, Welfare economics

---

Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection

Article Abstract:

Implementation problems in pincipal-agent models can be simplified using additional structures.

Analysis, Economic research, Agency theory

Some parts © 2012 Advameg, Inc.