Productivity under group incentives: an experimental study

Article Abstract:

A group's performance under an incentive program is dependent on the group's past performance with a preceding incentive scheme. Target-based schemes are also found to be outperformed by relative performance schemes. While monitoring can encourage workers to achieve high efforts, the probability of monitoring is costly since it must be on a high level. The results were derived from an experimental examination of various incentive schemes for groups such as monitoring and tournament-based schemes, profit sharing and simple revenue-sharing.

Bonus & Merit Payments, Industrial productivity, Incentives (Business), Bonuses

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Can affirmative action be cost effective? An experimental examination of price-preference auctions

Article Abstract:

The assumption that affirmative action programs are cost increasing is tested. The results showed that price-preference auctions which favor high-cost minority firms enhance cost effectiveness of government procurements and minority representation. However, price preferences must be chosen correctly for too great a price preference decreases cost effectiveness. In particular, auctions that used a five percent price preference rule outperformed those which had no preferences given.

Economic aspects, Affirmative action, Minorities, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding

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Decision making with naive advice

Article Abstract:

A set of experimental results, which concentrate on the impact of naive advice on decisions-making, is surveyed. It was found that advice tends to be followed, changes behavior, is welfare-improving and the process of giving and receiving advice fosters learning.

United States, Decision-making, Decision making, Analysis, Welfare economics

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