Reputation in dynamic games

Article Abstract:

A patient large player obtains almost the largest payoff consistent with small players selecting a best response in a large finite truncation of the dynamic game. This is true in every Nash equilibrium in games with a large player and a large number of small players whose individual actions remain unobserved. The two environments under which reputation is examined include a situation where the large player is more patient than the small players and where both large and small players are patient.

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When are nonanonymous players negligible?

Article Abstract:

The effects of a small player's nonanonymity condition may be held insignificant or negligible if the actions of other large players remain limited, thus preventing them from manipulating the behavior of other small players. Results further revealed that payoff bounds suggested by Fudenberg and Levine's principles tend to limit the payoff value of small players, thereby making their actions negligible to the whole system.

Models

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Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

Article Abstract:

The degree of reputation of players with conflicting interests in repeated games is examined.

United States, Reputation

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