Reputation in perturbed repeated games

Article Abstract:

Reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting are examined to the determine the equilibrium playoffs of patient players. Patient players are those who play the same move in every game. Results indicate the existence of non-trivial lower bound on equilibrium payoffs in Nash equilibrium conditions. This is different from Fudenberg and Levine's study on games wherein short-run players face a single long-run player.

Games of chance (Mathematics)

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The electricity market game

Article Abstract:

From a general equilibrium perspective, the effects of imperfect competition in unregulated electricity markets are examined. It is demonstrated that both the large peak-period price spikes and the marked reduction in addition to capacity can be explained by the horizontal market power.

Electric Utilities, Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Electric services, Competitions

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