The labor-leisure choice in executive compensation plans: Does too much pay reduce REIT performance?

Article Abstract:

This study demonstrates that when Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) mangers are paid ohigho levels of compensation performance may suffer. A theoretical model is developed to study the relationship between pay and performance.

Executive changes & profiles, Real estate investment trusts, Real Estate Invest Trusts, Analysis, Usage, Officials and employees, Economics, Economic theory, Real estate executives

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Contracting on real option payoffs

Article Abstract:

A design of contracts that pay managers on the basis of a project payoff is presented. Any neutral manager, who will be taking risk to invest, will not be offering incentives to lose perks at the consumption time.

Human resource management, Managers, Company personnel management

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Investment timing under uncertainty in oligopoly: symmetry or leadership?

Article Abstract:

Companies' investment-timing decisions in oligopoly set-up are analyzed. Investment-timing outcomes are very important for making the exact form of investment commitment.

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