Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Economics

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Economics

When are agents negligible?

Article Abstract:

Equilibria in a dynamic context can be markedly different in a model with a finite number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents. To examine this paradox, it is contextualized in a simple strategic setting where it is a general phenomenon. The paradox vanishes when there is a noisy observation of the actions of the players. The aggregate level of noise does not fade in a very fast manner as the number of players is increased. A discontinuity in extensive-form games is possible when shifting from the finite player to continuum limit.

Author: Levine, David K., Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1995
Models, Economic development

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Trembling invisible hand equilibrium

Article Abstract:

An analysis of a market with conditions influenced by an invisible hand equilibrium is presented. The analysis focuses on an economic setting where trading ownership in a finite collection of long-lived assets conditions intertemporal and interstate trade and where the market's invisible hand exhibits imperfection in meeting all agents' demands. It is shown that the solution to a finite dimensional fixed point problem generates an approximationof Markov equilibrium conditions.

Author: Levine, David K.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1993
Markov processes

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

Article Abstract:

Research into the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game is presented. It is demonstrated that for some parameter values cooperative play becomes the unique long-run stochastically stable distribution.

Author: Johnson, Philip (American architect), Levine, David K., Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2001
Administration of General Economic Programs, Economic Statistics & Research, Economic conditions, Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation, Games

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Analysis, Equilibrium (Economics), Research
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: Are assets fungible? Testing the behavioral theory of life-cycle savings. Confidence lost and - partially - regained: consumer response to food scares
  • Abstracts: Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth. Transitional dynamics in an R and D based growth model with imitation: comparing its predictions to the data
  • Abstracts: The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object. Learning in games by random sampling
  • Abstracts: Inside debt, aggregate demand, and the Cambridge theory of distribution. The stock market and investment: another look at the micro-foundations of q theory
  • Abstracts: The weather factor and variability in China's grain supply. Opening of China's Trade, Labour Market Reform and Impact on Rural Wages
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2026 Advameg, Inc.