Job matching, temporary public employment, and equilibrium unemployment

Article Abstract:

The macroeconomic effects of temporary public employment, or 'relief', programs are examined in a matching model in which wages are determined by Nash bargains between individual firms and workers. Relief programs have a direct impact on unemployment and wage pressure, which is based on whether programs increase unemployment outflow or reduce unemployment inflow. The fall in unemployment may be counteracted or reinforced by the induced adjustment of wages and vacancies. It is partially possible to reduce equilibrium unemployment by means of temporary public job programs.

Noncommercial research organizations, Unemployment, Public service employment

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Unemployment duration, unemployment benefits, and labor market programs in Sweden

Article Abstract:

A model is developed to analyze the Swedish unemployment insurance system. The Swedish system includes an active labor market policy, unemployment benefit system with a fixed duration of benefit payments and centralized wage bargaining. It is shown that the job finding rates and transition rates to labor market programs increase with the approach of the expiration dates of unemployment benefits.

Sweden, Economic policy, Labor policy, Supplemental unemployment benefits

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Decentralization of active labour market policy: the case of Swedish local employment service committees

Article Abstract:

Using Swedish pilot programme in 1996, the positive effects of decentralization in labour market policy are analyzed.

United States, Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs), Labor Training & Services, Decentralized Organization, Decentralization (Management)

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