A probabilistic model of learning in games
Article Abstract:
A probabilistic model of learning in games is derived to verify the premise that the common knowledge of strategic intent results from repeated interaction. It is shown that play will more often than not remain within one of the stage game's 'minimal inclusive sets.' It is also shown that sets in important classes of games such as those with strategic complementarities and bandwagon effects are all singleton Nash.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1996
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Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: an experiment in the Slovak Republic
Article Abstract:
An ultimatum bargaining game held in Slovak Republic in 1994 was analyzed in terms of the impact of financial incentives on the behavior of players. The bargaining game revealed that financial stakes only create a slight impact on a play involving inexperienced players. It was also revealed that proposals under high stakes settings decrease gradually as players begin to obtain experience.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1998
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