Prakash and Sertel's theory of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems-twenty years later
Article Abstract:
A new class of examples that illustrates Prakash and Sertel's (PS) existence theory of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems is presented. Existing social systems characterized by unusually interactive technological relationships between firms in an economy where the participants are mainly concerned with maximizing benefits are examined using the PS existence theory. Twenty-year literature on abstract economies, generalized games and economic equilibrium are also discussed. It is concluded that the PS existence theory reflects the general economic situations better than alternative applicable theories.
Publication Name: The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0304-4068
Year: 1996
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On the varieties of matrix probabilities in nonarchimedian decision theory
Article Abstract:
The restrictive characteristics of matrix-probability applications in nonarchimedean theory are evaluated. Reasons identified for its restrictive nature include: one-way implication of relationships between preferences; need for additional basis to derive a "common template" for matrix-probabilities; and the unseen real-value content of the basis used. It is concluded that the coverage of matrix-probabilities is considerably expanded by solving the restrictive problems and considering additional nonarchimedean parameters.
Publication Name: The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0304-4068
Year: 1996
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A theory of divided government
Article Abstract:
A spatial model of voting is derived wherein policy outcomes are a function of both the party which holds the executive and the composition of the legislature. Results show that the model has testable implications for voting behavior in democracies. For the US in particular, it predicts split-ticket voting, a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and legislature and midterm electoral cycle.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1996
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- Abstracts: Existence of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems. Existence in undiscounted non-stationary non-convex multisector environments
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- Abstracts: Postulates for the internal rate of return of an investment project. Irrational entry, rational exit
- Abstracts: Performance functions and reinforcement learning for trading systems and portfolios. The evolution of conventions