Repeated games with differential time preferences
Article Abstract:
Strategic games require patient agents who are willing to play with identical time preferences. Each player agrees to play a set of feasible pay-offs of the repeated game that coincides with the stage-game. Patience is necessary to sustain all feasible and individually rational payoffs. Pay-offs offer mutual benefit to players using currently imposed time preference. The convex-hull of the underlying stage-game pay-offs will be smaller than the set of feasible repeated pay-offs.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1999
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The "Devil's Horns" problem of inverting confluent characteristic functions
Article Abstract:
An analysis of the problems arising from the invertion of confluent characteristic functions reveals that distortions arising are both analytical and numerical. The study also points out that joint degeneracy within a function may be expressed as bivariate and multivariate cases. The graph of these inconsistencies take the form of two sharp spikes otherwise known as 'devil's horns.'
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1997
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