Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability
Article Abstract:
Strategyproof social choice functions (SCFs) are decomposable when preferences are strict orderings and separable. Aside from such condition, strategyproof SCFs become decomposable when the domain of preferences are rich. Utilization of a framework in which assumption of preferences is undertaken shows that a highly general decomposability result can be obtained in a situation where all of the individuals' preferences are separable in relation to a common partition of the components' set.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1999
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Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores
Article Abstract:
Attainment of a strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto efficient solution for a wide class of allocation problems with indivisibilities is possible only through core correspondence. Such solution chooses an allocation in the core when the core is nonempty. The strategy-proofness of any selection from the core correspondence remains as long as the core of each problem is externally stable and the core correspondence is substantially single-valued.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1999
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