Impact of knowledge regarding alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiations: whose knowledge counts?

Article Abstract:

Study 1 examined whose knowledge of a best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA) produces documented benefits. The results suggest that (a) joint gain and the number of integrative trade-offs increase when the actor with the alternative is made aware of the alternative and (b) the actor with the alternative obtains a marginal increase in personal gain only when both negotiators (i.e., both the actor and the opponent) are aware of the actor's alternative. Study 2 explored changes in actor and opponent cognitions that result when each is informed about the actor's alternative. Results suggest that the existence of an attractive alternative changes actor and opponent walk away point (often referred to as reservation point), perception of efficacy regarding negotiation skill, perceived value of the commodity being negotiated, and distribution of power. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Author: Pinkley, Robin L.

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The effects of partisan third parties on negotiator behavior and outcome perceptions

Article Abstract:

Two sources of third-party partisanship are: (1) the preexisting affiliation a third party may have with the negotiators and (2) theovert support a third party demonstrates by imposing an outcome. In 2 experiments, subjects involved in a negotiation simulation were told prior to negotiation that the third party was either positively affiliated with their side or with their opponent's side. In both studies, third parties imposed settlements on the disputants, reflecting varying degrees of overt support. Theresults suggest that negative third-party affiliation reduced disputant outcomeexpectations (thereby improving the likelihood of an agreement) and led to enhanced ratings of outcome and third-party satisfaction relative to favorable third-party affiliation. The results are consistent with predictions made by both prospect and control theory. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Author: Conlon, Donald E., Ross, William H.

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Confirmatory factor analysis of the styles of handling interpersonal conflict: first-order factor model and its invariance across groups

Article Abstract:

Confirmatory factor analysis of data (from 5 samples, n = 484 full-time employed management students; n = 550 public administrators; n = 214 university administrators; n = 250 bank managers and employees in Bangladesh; and n = 578 managers and employees) on the 28 items of the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory - II were performed with LISREL 7. The results provided support for the convergent and discrimination validities of the subscales measuring the 5 styles of handling interpersonal conflict (integrating, obligating, dominating, avoiding, and compromising) and general support for the invariance of the 5-factor model across referent roles (i.e., superiors, subordinates, and peers), organizational levels (top, middle, lower, and nonmanagement), and 4 of the 5 samples. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Author: Rahim, M. Afzalur, Magner, Nace R.
Usage, Factor analysis, Discriminant analysis, Interpersonal conflict

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Subjects list: Research, Negotiation, Negotiations, Conflict management
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