Econometrica 2001 - Abstracts

Econometrica 2001
TitleSubjectAuthors
A FOLK THEOREM FOR ASYNCHRONOUSLY REPEATED GAMES.MathematicsYOON, KIHO
BEHAVIOR IN MULTI-UNIT DEMAND AUCTIONS: EXPERIMENTS WITH UNIFORM PRICE AND DYNAMIC VICKREY AUCTIONS.MathematicsKAGEL, JOHN H., LEVIN, DAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.MathematicsTIROLE, JEAN
COSTLY BARGAINING AND RENEGOTIATION.MathematicsANDERLINI, LUCA, FELLI, LEONARDO
EFFICIENCY OF LARGE PRIVATE VALUE AUCTIONS.MathematicsSWINKELS, JEROEN M.
FAST EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION BY RATIONAL PLAYERS LIVING IN A CHANGING WORLD.MathematicsBURDZY, KRZYSZTOF, FRANKEL, DAVID M., PAUZNER, ADY
LONG-TERM DEBT AND OPTIMAL POLICY IN THE FISCAL THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL.MathematicsCOCHRANE, JOHN H.
MEASURING MARKET POWER IN THE READY-TO-EAT CEREAL INDUSTRY.MathematicsNEVO, AVIV
NONLINEAR REGRESSIONS WITH INTEGRATED TIME SERIES.MathematicsPARK, JOON Y., PHILLIPS, PETER C. B.
ON THE GENERIC FINITENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOME DISTRIBUTIONS IN GAME FORMS.MathematicsGOVINDAN, SRIHARI, MCLENNAN, ANDREW
POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR THE PURCHASING-POWER-PARITY PUZZLE? SAMPLING AND SPECIFICATION BIASES IN MEAN-REVERSION TESTS OF THE LAW OF ONE PRICE.MathematicsTAYLOR, ALAN M.
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES ON SUBJECTIVELY UNAMBIGUOUS EVENTS.MathematicsEPSTEIN, LARRY G., ZHANG, JIANKANG
UNOBSERVABLE INVESTMENT AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM.MathematicsGUL, FARUK
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