| Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 1995 |
| Title | Subject | Authors |
|---|
| Accountability and a metric for credibility and compliance. | Economics | Furstenberg, George M. |
| Asset specificities, multinational firms and international trade.(includes related appendix giving technical details of calculations) | Economics | Beladi, Hamid, Prasad, Kislaya |
| Assigning the liability for past pollution: lessons from the US mining industry.(includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Tilton, John E. |
| Coase among the Purepechas: transaction costs and institutional change in a Mexican Indian pueblo. | Economics | Acheson, James |
| Collusive aspects of cost revelation through antidumping complaints.(anti-dumping complaints and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) | Economics | Hartigan, James C. |
| Competition in markets for credence goods.(includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Wolinsky, Asher |
| Crime, punishment and social expenditure. | Economics | Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Osborne, Martin J. |
| Culture and its relationship to economic change. | Economics | Jones, Eric L. |
| Economic crime and Russian reform.(includes related statistical appendix) | Economics | Alexeev, Michael, Leitzel, Jim, Gaddy, Clifford |
| Economic organization and conflict. (includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Carlton, Dennis W. |
| Firms, 'megaorganizations' and markets: a network view. | Economics | Mattsson, Lars-Gunner |
| Free trade vesus managed trade: a constitutional political economy perspective. | Economics | Thorbecke, Willem |
| Geographical transaction costs and regional quality ladders. | Economics | Stadler, Manfred |
| Hare and hedgehog revisited: the regulation of markets that have escaped regulated markets.(includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Schanze, Erich |
| Informed courts, uninformed individuals, and the economics of judicial hindsight.(includes related appendix giving technical details) | Economics | Ben-Shahar, Omri |
| Institutions affect fairness: experimental investigation. | Economics | Frey, Bruno S., Bohnet, Iris |
| Irving Fisher on a 'fundamental theorum' in neo-Austrian capital theory. | Economics | Velupillai, Kumaraswamy |
| Law and market organization: the historical experience in Germany from 1900 to the law against restraints of competition (1957).(includes related appendix on 1923 law on competition and related articles commetning on the paper) | Economics | Norr, Knut Wolfgang |
| Legal implications of imperfect information in consumer markets.(includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Schwartz, Alan |
| Megaorganisation in Antiquity: the Roman Empire. | Economics | Maier, Franz Georg |
| On the existnce of care equilibria under tort law. | Economics | Endres, Alfred, Querner, Immo |
| Organizations versus institutions.(differences in the economic impact of organizations and institutions) | Economics | Khalil, Elias L. |
| Political organizations, social structure, and institutional success: reflections from Gerona and Venice during the commercial revolution. | Economics | Greif, Avner |
| Property rights and the precondition for markets: the case of the Amazon frontier.(includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Alston, Lee J., Libecap, Gary D., Schneider, Robert |
| Risky debt, managerial ownership and capital structure: new fundamental doubts on the classical agency approach. | Economics | Kursten, Wolfgang |
| Roman law and Rome as a megaorganism. | Economics | Burge, Alfons |
| Shirking versus managerial incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs): a note on a possible misunderstanding of principal-agent theory. | Economics | Guth, Werner |
| Social networks can resolve actor paradoxes in economics and psychology. | Economics | White, Harrison C. |
| The dependency of wage contracts on monetary policy.(includes related technical appendix) | Economics | Selgin, George, Foldvary, Fred |
| The enclosure of a common property resource: private and group ownership in equilibrium.(includes related technical appendix) | Economics | Wagner, Thomas |
| The essence of the megacorporation: shared context, not structural hierarchy. | Economics | Ghoshal, Sumantra, Moran, Peter, Almeida-Costa, Luis |
| The prisoners' dilemma or the jury's dilemma? A popular story with a dubious name.(economic aspects of the prisoner's dilemma story) | Economics | Holm, Hakan J. |
| The Roman Empire: domination and integration.(links between ancient Rome and Europe in the 1990s) | Economics | Martin, Jochen |
| The stability of megaorganizations: the Tokugawa state.(economic growth and political stability in Japanese history) | Economics | Saxonhouse, Gary R. |
| The variety of distribution systems.(includes related articles commenting on the paper) | Economics | Muller-Hagedorn, Lothar |
| Trade liberalization, factor mobility and regional growth. | Economics | Walz, Uwe |
| Wage negotiations under two-sided incomplete information with the possibility of side contracts. | Economics | Frascatore, Mark |
| Why capital hires labour in team production.(moral hazards and budgets in team production) | Economics | Valsecchi, Irene |
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