The Managerial Economics of Civil Litigation
Article Abstract:
As the United States has become a more litigious society, executives are finding more of their time and their firms' resources consumed by litigation. This paper attempts to assist their decision making with regard to legal matters by looking at the following questions: (1) Under what conditions should a potential plaintiff litigate a specific issue? (2) Under what conditions should a defendant faced with a lawsuit respond forcefully to it? (3) How can legal expenses be budgeted and controlled by both sides? (4) What are the most likely conditions under which both plaintiff and defendant would be willing to seek out of court settlement? The research determines the economic requisites of both a plaintiff's decision to litigate an issue and the corresponding defendant's decision on how to respond to the suit. The decisions are viewed as both commensurate and competitive with other managerial operating , e.g. capital budgeting and market expansion, that make demands upon the firm's resources. Models from economics and learning theory are employed both to illustrate the relationship between expenditures on a civil suit and the probability of success and to show how litigation costs should be budgeted and controlled. The research also shows both the means conditions under which it is advantageous from both sides to seals an out of court settlements and the to estimate the probability of out of court settlement in civil litigation in general. This latter is shown under the most general conditions to be a minimum of 0.66 and to rise as the participants in the litigation become more risk averse. (Reprinted by Permission of Publisher.)
Publication Name: Management Science
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0025-1909
Year: 1985
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Distribution channels: an extension of exclusive retailership
Article Abstract:
The distribution channel mechanisms of retailers selling differentiated products at the same location were investigated. The retail and product competition was modeled simultaneously within a single channel framework consisting of two manufacturers and two retailers to analyze the effect of different power structures on equilibrium profits and prices. Closed-form analytical solutions for price, profit and other quantities were derived for each distribution channel structure under the different power scenarios. Empirical results showed that competition at the retail segment eliminates the bilateral monopoly of manufacturers, suggesting that it can act as a substitute for other forms of distribution channel coordination. Furthermore, competition at both the manufacturer and retail levels of distribution has a substantial effect on prices and profits.
Publication Name: Management Science
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0025-1909
Year: 1998
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Mintzburg Was Right: A Replication and Extension of the Nature of Managerial Work
Article Abstract:
Managers' jobs are fragmented. They have little free time, are constantly interrupted, are in contact with many people, and do not have much control over how they spend their time. Most activities have a very short duration. Scheduled meetings consume more of a manager's time than any other activity. There is little open ended touring. Subordinates consume about one-third to one-half of a manager's time.
Publication Name: Management Science
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0025-1909
Year: 1983
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