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You can pay me now and you can pay me later: the dynamic response of executive compensation to firm performance

Article Abstract:

Most empirical studies on the relationship between executive pay and firm performance have focused almost exclusively on estimating the short-run pay-performance sensitivity. To correct the limitations of these works, a study is conducted that estimates the complete dynamic response of CEO compensation to an innovation in company performance. The results show that cumulative reaction of pay to firm performance is about 10 times greater than the contemporaneous response, and that pay increases over the next four or five years usually follow a onetime company performance innovation. The findings also reveal that during the 40-year study period, pay packages have moved closer towards longer-term compensation arrangements and closer links between pay and performance.

Author: Boschen, John F., Smith, Kimberly J.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: The Journal of Business
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0021-9398
Year: 1995
Performance

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Executive compensation in the life insurance industry

Article Abstract:

The compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) in both stock and mutual insurance companies is examined using the managerial discretion hypothesis. Executives of stock companies receive higher compensation compared to executives of mutual companies. Subsidiary executives, similarly, receive greater compensation from stock companies than from mutual insurance companies. This disparity in compensation is in accordance with variations in managerial discretion and in sets of corporate investment opportunity. Executives associated with affiliated companies receive less compensation than unaffiliated executives. Greater consideration is also placed on firm performance in the management of compensation for CEOs in stock companies than for CEOs in mutual companies.

Author: Smith, Clifford W., Jr., Mayers, David
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: The Journal of Business
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0021-9398
Year: 1992
Life insurance, Insurance industry, Life insurance industry, Administrative discretion

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On the corporate demand for insurance: evidence form the reinsurance market

Article Abstract:

A study of 1,276 casualty/property insurance firms was conducted to examine the determinants of corporate reinsurance purchases to learn about the corporate demand for insurance. Research results indicate that ownership structure is important and that firms with less diversified investment portfolios make greater reinsurance purchases. Group and subsidiary relations affect the demand for reinsurance because group members and subsidiaries reinsure more often. Additionally, research results indicate that credit standing, size, and geographic concentration decrease the demand for reinsurance.

Author: Smith, Clifford W., Jr., Mayers, David
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: The Journal of Business
Subject: Business, general
ISSN: 0021-9398
Year: 1990
Analysis, Corporations, Reinsurance, Insurance

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Subjects list: Research, Compensation and benefits, Compensation management, Chief executive officers
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