Axioms for the Shapley value on convex geometries

Article Abstract:

Four axioms were derived for the Shapley value on convex geometries. The axioms, which can be satisfied by a distinct Shapley value, were obtained after making convex sets the feasible coalitions for the model of cooperative game. The Shapley value for games on convex geometries was utilized as power index to assess the voting power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences, Mathematics, Research, Geometrical models, Axioms

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Solving a multi-objective possibilistic problem through compromise programming

Article Abstract:

The usage of multiple criteria mathematical models and probability theories for decision making in a multi-objective scenario with imprecise parameters is discussed.

Methods, Multiple criteria decision making, Probabilities, Probability theory

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The distribution of power in the European Constitution

Article Abstract:

Empirical model for derivation of power indices to measure voting power of countries in the European parliament, based on Banzhaf index, is presented.

Membership, Suffrage, Voting rights, European Union. European Parliament

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