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Business, international

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Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings

Article Abstract:

The relationships between executive remuneration, the possibility of executive dismissal, company characteristics and certain influences in pay and performance are evaluated. It has been observed that company size and growth are more closely attached to executive compensation compared to either relative return on capital employed or relative share performance. It has also been noted that institutional holdings or the presence of non-executive directors have considerably little effect on executive compensation and dismissal.

Author: Hughes, Alan, Cosh, Andy
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1997
Management Termination, Executives, Managers, Institutional investments, Employment terminations, Executive dismissals

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Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: new evidence from micro data

Article Abstract:

Two hypotheses, which concern an apparent relationship between CEO compensation in Japan and financial keiretsus, or corporate groups forged by bank or equity affiliation, were tested using micro data. The first and second theories concern level and structure, respectively, of CEO compensation, and it has been observed that CEOs of keiretsu firms earn an average of 21% less than those of independent firms, augmenting observations that such CEOs also represent the interest of main banks.

Author: Kato, Takao
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1997
Officials and employees, Japan, Chief executive officers, Keiretsu system

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Buyer groups

Article Abstract:

An alternative explanation to the cartel theory of group formation is investigated. This explanation deals with the incentives for collective contracting in a market that is monopolistically competitive. One assumption is that the market gives rise to a number of companies or products. Buyer groups can then benefit by entering into exclusive deals with sellers, at lower transaction costs.

Author: Winter, Ralph A., Mathewson, Frank
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1997
Purchasing Management, Models, Purchasing, Monopolistic competition, Buy-sell agreements, Group purchasing organizations

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Subjects list: Analysis, Compensation and benefits, Compensation management, Executive compensation
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