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Business, international

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Imperfections in labor markets and the scope of the firm

Article Abstract:

Adverse selection and worker uncertainty about job preferences have been known to prod firms to offer a wider selection of jobs for potential employees. The equilibrium wage structure for firms without a wide array of jobs is characterized by retention job offers increasing in ability, which is not found in firms with various jobs to offer potential employees. A study shows that the interaction between uncertain preferences and adverse selection results in a second-best, second-period allocation of workers across jobs and that the scope of integration is wider than the first-best outcome.

Author: Novos, Ian E.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1995
Research, Labor market, Employee selection

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Industry equilibrium, uncertainty, and futures markets

Article Abstract:

Competitive long-run industry equilibrium with uncertainty and futures trading is investigated. Bias (backwardation or contango) develops in a long-run industry equilibrium under uncertain demand and risk aversion. The bias relies on the presence of risk premium and the duration of the period. A risk-neutral company has excess capacity under additive risk when the supply is uncertain but has appropriate capacity under multiplicative risk.

Author: Haruna, Shoji
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1996
Analysis, Economic aspects, Risk (Economics), Futures, Equilibrium (Economics), Uncertainty

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Entry deterrence and signaling in markets for search goods

Article Abstract:

Entrant stores may easily signal high quality of products to consumers when locating the store does not cost more time and effort. This factor can serve as a deterrent for consumers who are immediately attracted to an incumbent store's quality signal through high prices. This also supports another signaling model where the entrant can compare its quality signal to the incumbent's exposed strategy information.

Author: Bijl, Paul W.J. de
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1997
Marketing Management, Management, Product quality, Marketing, Consumer behavior

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