The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda

Article Abstract:

A study has been conducted to determine which bargaining type, right-to-manage or efficient-bargaining, can be considered as the industry equilibrium. Findings have indicated that efficient bargaining emerges as the industry equilibrium, even more so under the threat of market entry, for most market configurations, consistent with empirical tests of efficient bargaining versus labor demand market. The model generated by the study shows clearly that labor market organization can have a significant impact on entry deterrence.

Analysis, Business economics, Managerial economics

---

Corporate restructuring in a collusive oligopoly

Article Abstract:

Horizontal mergers have been known to concentrate economic power in the hands of a few companies. This has forced public agencies to look closely into proposed horizontal mergers to minimize economic concentration. In a repeated oligopoly, concentration-increasing capital transfers and horizontal mergers are bound to reduce price by levels higher than those presented in previous research.

Price fixing, Industrial concentration

---

Delegation and mergers in oligopoly

Article Abstract:

Research investigating the relationships between mergers and the use of strategic delegations are discussed. Particular attention is given to applications to oligopolies characterized by cost functions and linear demand.

Influence, Delegated legislation

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Beyond the Gantt Chart: project management moving on. Performance pay and corporate structure in UK firms. Softbank: an internet keiretsu and its leveraging of information asymmetries
• Abstracts: A strange case of convergence: two cities: Edinburgh and Glasgow. Baby dolls
• Abstracts: Slim pickings. Corporate clarity as a driver of M&A activity
• Abstracts: A government damaged. The beginning of the end for the longest-ruling party. The blame game in Mexico
• Abstracts: Pay attention to IT. Paving the way for small companies to expand

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.