Discussion of 'Modelling Takeover Likelihood.' (response to Ronan G. Powell in this issue, p. 1009)

Article Abstract:

The reasons behind firms' unfriendliness or hostility towards takeovers and the problems during the bidding process are analyzed. Hostility on the part of firms to be acquired could not be easily determined. For example, a firm which rejected the initial bid is not necessarily hostile since there were various variables to be considered. Classifying such a firm as a hostile one is thus inappropriate. A better indicator of the hostility of target firms is one which considers changes in the top management, rather than the rejection of an initial bid.

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Discussion of 'Agency, Bid Resistance and the Market for Corporate Control.' (response to Peter Holl and Dimitris Kyriazis, p. 1037)

Article Abstract:

A critique on the study about agency, bid resistance and corporate control further clarifies or negates its findings. One point that was raised was the lack of evidence about the effects of proposed acquisition by a friendly bidder on the incumbent manager of the target firm. Furthermore, the generation of wealth gains through bid resistance was insufficiently explained. In addition, the methods used in the study for the interpretation of the data were criticized.

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The changing nature of corporate control and ownership structure

Article Abstract:

The effect of changes in corporate ownership and financial control in mergers, acquisitions and privatization may be linked to the form of ownership change. Corporate restructuring demands continued enhancement of performance and creation of value. The nature of 'value drivers', motivations and bargaining power can only be fully understood after closer examination of the areas of valuation, corporate control and governance.

Management Functions, Management, Privatization, Privatization (Business)

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: The importance of being quoted. Proshare to look into new issues
• Abstracts: Wealth creation and bid resistance in UK takeover bids. Modelling takeover likelihood. Agency, bid resistance and the market for corporate control

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