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Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective: a comment

Article Abstract:

The game-theoretic model of Pascal Frantz and Martin Walker which resulted in a non-disclosure equilibrium in a situation where a company manager has information which can affect both the company's stock price and the union's wage bargaining was studied. This model failed to represent some of the actual wage bargaining conditions that are essential for obtaining the optimal disclosure methods. Nevertheless, their model shows the applicability of analytical methods for examining the employee disclosure question.

Author: Peel, David A., Pope, Peter F.
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0306-686X
Year: 1997
Evaluation, Stocks, Disclosure (Securities law), Collective bargaining

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UK accounting disclosure practices and information asymmetry during the first quarter of the twentieth century: the effects on book returns and dividend cover

Article Abstract:

The distortion effects of the available information for shareholders were examined by evaluating the differences between two standard measures of corporate performance, returns on equity capital and equity dividend cover. Data were gathered from published yearly reports and from internal accounting data of 30 UK quoted corporations from a wide range of industries. Findings revealed that there was very little distortion until 1914 or the First World War. Distortions grew even after the war.

Author: Arnold, A.J.
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0306-686X
Year: 1998
United Kingdom, History, Dividends, Disclosure statements (Accounting), Return on investment, Rate of return

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Voluntary disclosure of nonproprietary information: a complete equilibrium characterization

Article Abstract:

The article examines financial market models to determine reasons for the failure of the disclosure principle derived from game theoretic models. Multiple equilibria in the models reveal that bad types do not disclose while good types will; full disclosure equilibrium is an equilibrium set limit point.

Author: Korn, Evelyn, Schiller, Ulf
Publisher: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Publication Name: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0306-686X
Year: 2003
Germany, Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors, Financial Regulation & Reporting, Comparative analysis, Equilibrium (Economics), Financial disclosure, Econometric models

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Subjects list: Models, Analysis, Game theory
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