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On the interrelation between production technology, job design, and incentives

Article Abstract:

The assembly line and the team task assignments are studied in a dual-stage manufacturing process. Each agent is responsible for a particular stage in the assembly line task assignment while all agents have a joint responsibility for all tasks in the team task assignment. The team approach to task assignment provides optimal results for simple manufacturing technologies where quality at the early production stages is essential to the final-stage task. Better technologies give the assembly line an important role, but additional developments in technologies will eventually make the team approach a more optimal solution.

Author: Hemmer, Thomas
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Accounting and Economics
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0165-4101
Year: 1995
Economic aspects, Economics, Manufacturing processes, Manufacturing, Incentives (Business), Work design

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Performance measurement systems, incentives, and the optimal allocation of responsibilities

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to analyze the joint choice of responsibility assignment, performance measures and rewards for a two-stage process where the quality of the initial stage work influences the needed final stage effort. Responsibilities were assigned to give the initial stage agent an incentive to sabotage the final stage. Results indicated conditions under which it is cost-effective to create and to contractually utilize such information.

Author: Hemmer, Thomas
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Accounting and Economics
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0165-4101
Year: 1998
Production Mgmt NEC, Organizational effectiveness, Production management

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Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts

Article Abstract:

The appropriateness of adding a convex component, like stock options, to an optimal, managerial compensation contract is considered.

Author: Verrecchia, Robert E., Kim, Oliver, Hemmer, Thomas
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Accounting and Economics
Subject: Business
ISSN: 0165-4101
Year: 1999
Stock Options, Executive compensation

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Subjects list: Analysis
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