A theory of holdouts in wage bargaining

Article Abstract:

An evaluation of a model that portrays 'holdouts' as a delaying tactic in wage bargaining reveals that the incentive to use holdouts increases as the number of wage negotiations increase within a particular industry. Moreover, the study reveals that holdouts are 'bunched' within industries as others soon follow after one holdout has ended and that holdouts ending later in a group are less likey to end in strikes.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Labor Relations, Research, Analysis, Labor economics, Collective bargaining

---

A spatial theory of trade

Article Abstract:

Impact of trade barriers, such as national borders, on international and regional trade with relation to agglomeration and congestion forces is presented.

United States, Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Administration of General Economic Programs, Trade Barriers, Economic aspects, Forecasts and trends, Influence, Market trend/market analysis, International trade, Distribution (Economics), Boundaries, Boundaries (Geography)

---

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game. The optimal design of a market. Voluntary implementation
• Abstracts: Executive briefing. Gaza: the closure
• Abstracts: Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime. White-collar crime writ small: a case study of bagels, donuts, and the honor system
• Abstracts: A note on closet--indexing. Subsistence consumption, habit formation and the demand for long-term bonds. The value of active portfolio management
• Abstracts: The organisation of capabilities. Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies. Production in advance versus production to order

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.