An experimental analysis of subgame perfect play: the entry deterrence game

Article Abstract:

An experiments model was devised for a two-step, two-individual non-cooperative game where the two parties face a succession of possible entry situations. Payoffs and entry costs are known to both players. The subgame perfect equilibrium requires player I to select an entry preventing output and player E not entering. However, a substantial portion of E players entered when there were negative net payoffs and a non-trivial number of I players did not aspire for deterrence.

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An experimental solidarity game

Article Abstract:

A random sample of 120 students at a German university participated in a solidarity game with the potential of winning 10,00 Deutsche marks. The altruistic propensities of the participants was assessed in double blind tests by asking what amounts they would be willing to forgo to losers if they won. Results showed that the inclination of most players to give to losers was influenced by factors such as the behavior of others, gender, and education.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Psychology & Psychiatry, Motivation (Psychology), Altruism, Altruism (Human behavior)

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Teaching children cooperation - an application of experimental game theory

Article Abstract:

The behavior of children is studied using a game of Prisoner's dilemma. The effect of teaching cooperation is assessed, as is the impact of the age of the children.

Child development

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