Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?

Article Abstract:

The general assumption is that high valuations of the future encourage cooperation in long-term relationships. However, an intertemporal model of conflict was developed to show an antithetical possibility that a longer shadow of the future may undermine cooperation. In particular, this model demonstrated that the degree of inefficiency is positively related to the agents' valuation of the future, potential growth rates in resources, the size of initial resource endowments and the effectiveness of conflict.

Analysis, International economic relations

---

Cooperation and local interactions in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game

Article Abstract:

The equilibria for a population engaged in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game have been characterized. The two main models, the first of which deals in players who imitate the best strategy around, and the second one is where agents have freedom to choose their partners, are analysed in detailed.

Models, Prisoner's dilemma game, Simulation games in education, Simulation games (Education)

---

Cooperation and between-group competition

Article Abstract:

Cooperation and between-group competition are considered.

Research

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: The advantage to hiding one's hand: speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. Thrift stock returns and portfolio interest rate sensitivity
• Abstracts: Measuring core inflation. Inflation and Social Consensus in the Seventies. Incredibility and inflation in the EMS
• Abstracts: Argentina and the world capital market: saving, investment, and international capital mobility in the twentieth century
• Abstracts: Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts. The choice of cooperative strategies in sealed bid auctions

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.