Coalition-proof implementation

Article Abstract:

A theoretical model for complete information environment was designed in order to define the conditions necessary in implementing the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE). It was revealed that choice functions can only be deemed CPNE-implementable if the utility functions possessed by an individual are either analytic or quasilinear. It would also be important for choice functions to be restricted with respect to all other variables, excluding money. Further, CPNE implementation does not necessarily require the integration of integer games or modulo games.

Analysis, Information theory, Utility theory, Utility functions

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Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies

Article Abstract:

Equilibrium price and allocations are expected to be competitive when consumers hold the belief that they can affect the price. Convergence to a Walrasian allocation of the true limit economy is demonstrated by equilibrium allocations of economies. In addition, agents are assumed to create beliefs concerning how they affect prices. At market clearing prices, the reported demands reflect the competitive demands of the reported economy when the size of the economy grows.

Research, Economic aspects, Consumers

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