Competition over more than one prize

Article Abstract:

An all-pay auction framework is extended to allow for multiple rather than single prizes. The framework is used to analyze the mechanisms by which firms distribute incentives to encourage employees to work harder. It is shown that a firm with a dominant worker would maximize expected total worker effort by distributing prizes simultaneously. On the other hand, prizes are distributed sequentially when no worker is dominant.

Employee motivation, Incentives (Business)

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Competition and the evolution of efficiency

Article Abstract:

Competition is a positive influence on efficiency. Firms in an industry where competition does not exist generally tend to lack any push towards excellence. This situation eventually leads to their dissolution and their replacement or takeover by more efficient enterprises. Competitive pressures eventually create a stochastic equilibrium, particularly in a situation where there are a large number of firms.

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Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game

Article Abstract:

Research into the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules is presented. The contest which arises has a direction of discrimination which is opposite to that which a social planner would set if seeking to reduce the efficiency loss from mistaken selection.

Bribery

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