Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Economics

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Economics

Contingent fees for attorneys: an economic analysis

Article Abstract:

A well-informed client who brings an attorney a high-quality case should expect to pay a lower contingency fee than the client with the low-quality case less likely to be won. Also, a well-informed high-quality attorney can be expected to work for a higher contingency fee, based on the attorney's likelihood to win. Adverse-selection models are studied, one based on case quality and moral hazard and another considering lawyer ability. Implications of contingency fees on deterrence are presented, and it is predicted that attempts to limit contingency fees could reduce the deterrence level.

Author: Rubinfeld, Daniel L., Scotchmer, Suzanne
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1993
Practice of law, Contingency fees, Attorney and client

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Protecting early innovators: should second-generation products be patentable?

Article Abstract:

Patentholders have a greater incentive to develop basic technologies when they profit from applications or other second-generation products. An investigation is done to determine whether second-generation products ought to be protected through exclusive licenses or through their own patents under the assumption that they infringe the prior patent. It is argued that patents on second-generation products are not needed for their development and the patentholder collects bigger profits if applications or other second-generation products are not patentable.

Author: Scotchmer, Suzanne
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1996
Licenses, Patents & Trademarks, Intellectual property, Technological innovations, Patents

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Optimal awards and penalties when the probability of prevailing varies among plaintiffs

Article Abstract:

The optimal award to a winning plaintiff and the optimal penalty to a losing plaintiff is derived when the probability of prevailing is varied among plaintiffs. Findings show a positive optimal penalty for a losing plaintiff. This is in contrast to the common practice in the US. It is argued that lowering the value of suits for low-probability plaintiffs will discourage them to sue, thus saving on litigation costs.

Author: Rubinfeld, Daniel L., Polinsky, A. Mitchell
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1996
Research, Commercial arbitration, Actions and defenses, Litigation, Parties to actions

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Economic aspects
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: A positive theory of economic fairness. Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice. Fair shares: accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions
  • Abstracts: Policy forum: New Keynesian economic policies. Financial development and economic growth: assessing the evidence
  • Abstracts: Understanding underdevelopment: challenges for institutional economics from the point of view of poor countries: comment
  • Abstracts: On sympathy and games. Optimal assignment of principalship in teams
  • Abstracts: Product safety: liability, R&D, and signaling. Keeping society in the dark: on the admissibility of pretrial negotiations as evidence in court
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2025 Advameg, Inc.