Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart

Article Abstract:

The externalities of principal-agent relationship are discussed. Assuming contracts to be bilateral, a principal's approach to the job of issuing contracts to agents, when there is no coordination failure among them, is analyzed.

United States, Contracts & orders received, Goods & services distribution, Channels of Distribution, Contracts & orders let, Economic aspects, Behavior, Contract agreement, Distribution, Externalities (Economics), Commercial agents, Company distribution practices

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Menu theorems for bilateral contracting

Article Abstract:

The application of menu theorems to understand the allocations equilibrium in a bilateral contracting environment where multiple principals issue contracts independently to multiple agents is analyzed.

Canada, Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Forecasts and trends, Market trend/market analysis

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p-Best response set

Article Abstract:

A study on equilibrium selection using the set-valued concept, which is based on p-dominance concept of game theory, is presented. p-best response set is a generalized form of p-dominance concept.

France, Set theory, Fuzzy sets

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