Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures

Article Abstract:

Companies with plans to combine complementary skills usually prefer the Equity Joint Venture (EJV) as against other profit-sharing mechanisms. The distinction between equity shares and profit shares was examined. Findings indicated that, in situations of contractual incompleteness, marketable equity ownership offers a better ex ante incentives to the concerned parties as against non-transferable profit-sharing contracts because it allays ex post hold-up problems.

Joint-Venture Management, Economic aspects, Stocks, Management, Contracts, Joint ventures

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Organizational communication structure and performance

Article Abstract:

Research is presented describing the methods used to assess the effectiveness of hierarchical or polyarchy organizational structures in different working environments.

Research, Performance, Organizational behavior, Business communication

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