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Decentralization and collusion

Article Abstract:

The extent of optimality of decentralization is investigated using a mathematical model in which agents work in sequence on a project, share information without the principal's knowledge and therefore has the opportunity to collude with one another. The model imposes the limited liability constraint implying non-transferable utility between two agents, that is, an agent with no money cannot transfer money to the other agent. Results indicate that decentralization always leads to the optimal distribution of surplus.

Author: Sjostrom, Tomas, Baliga, Sandeep
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1998
Econometrics & Model Building, Econometrics, Agency theory, Business models, Decentralization (Management), Surplus (Accounting)

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Trend-reverting fluctuations in the life-cycle model

Article Abstract:

The aggregate time series provides evidence of short-term dynamic adjustment that appears to be governed by complex or negative real eigenvalues with examples and extension. The life-cycle economies are studied in which aggregate saving depends non-trivially on the distribution of wealth among cohorts.

Author: Azariadis, Costas, Bullard, James, Ohanian, Lee
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Life cycles (Biology), Distribution of wealth

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The curse of wealth and power

Article Abstract:

A model in which being more powerful does not necessarily imply being wealthier is studied. It is found that if there are at least three players and power is correlated with initial wealth, the second strongest player will always be worse off than one of the weaker players.

Author: Rubinstein, Ariel, Piccione, Michele
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Power (Philosophy)

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Subjects list: Models, Distribution (Economics), Wealth
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