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Destructive interference in an imperfectly competitive multi-security market

Article Abstract:

A model was developed to enhance the understanding of destructive interference. This phenomenon is specific to multi-security markets with imperfect competition. In this scenario, the addition of securities will not ensure increased trade compared to competitive settings. A new security could interfere in a destructive manner with the available securities. New futures markets may possibly remove underlying security markets. A general equilibrium model shows how an exchange of new securities accessed by insiders can topple leading security markets.

Author: Bhattacharya, Utpal, Spiegel, Matthew, Reny, Philip J.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
Research, Analysis, Financial markets, Monopolistic competition

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Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees

Article Abstract:

The determination of strong independence using weak independence and exchangeability is adopted in the analysis of a game theoretic problem. Weak independence assumes that the distribution of one random variable is not influenced by another observation while strong independence is determined by the estimations of the relative probability space. If an observer's evaluation of the players' choices suggests infinite experience, a consistent assessment will be generated on the game tree.

Author: Reny, Philip J., Kohlberg, Elon
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
Econometrics & Model Building, Group Dynamics, Models, Human resource management, Econometrics, Interpersonal relations, Probabilities, Probability theory, Game theory, Business models

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A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers

Article Abstract:

An analysis of a non-cooperative bargainingmodel is presented. The analysis focuses on Rubinstein's model and includes alternating offer variability for players in choosing offers. Player choices are then conditioned by contiuous time constraints. Results show that quick arbitrary reactions generate perfect equilibrium outcomes which approximate Rubinstein conditions and efficient settings.

Author: Reny, Philip J., Perry, Motty
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1993
Economic aspects, Negotiation, Negotiations

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