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Discretionary policy implementation and reform

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to investigate the influence on policy implementation of those who implement it, such as diplomats who participate as treaty negotiators, regulatory agencies, politically influential reformers and other delegates. A hypothetical situation was presented where two parties possess disparate preferences over the specified degree of reform and each faction can veto policy change. There are four possible different outcomes from this game, each of which was evaluated.

Author: Sutter, Daniel
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1999
Social aspects, Influence, Political aspects, Politicians, Bureaucracy, Political reform, Administrative agencies, Government agencies

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Constitutions and the growth of government

Article Abstract:

Constitutions play a vital role in checking government growth. Through the constitution, prohibitions can be undertaken to limit government size at a desirable level. Constitutional prohibitions limit a government by conserving the capability of its people to monitor the government. A law limiting the exercise of power can be easily implemented than a law that permits the use of power to facilitate resource allocation.

Author: Sutter, Daniel
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1998
Other Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities, Constitutional Procedures, National government, Constitutional law, Constitutions, Federal government, Power (Social sciences), Political power

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Collusion in a three-tier hierarchy: credible beliefs and pure self-interest

Article Abstract:

The occurrence of triangular or multilateral business collusion was analyzed in the context of principal-supervisor-agent relationship. It was revealed that during side contract negotiation, the presence of equilibrium refinement assumptions regarding type belief updating can precipitate the occurrence of collusion. Avoidance of collusion can only be achieved if the principal will ignore the supervisor.

Author: Frascatore, Mark R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1998
Research, Interpersonal relations, Social economics, Socioeconomics, Self-interest, Self interest

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Subjects list: Economic aspects, Economics
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