Endogenous formation of cooperation structures

Article Abstract:

The equilibrium cooperation structure is determined using a coalitional game which allows players to cooperate independently. The cooperation-formation game, which considers a best-response fictitious-play learning process, indicates a stable equilibria that maximizes the learning potential. This potential only exists if players can derive equal benefits from the coalitional game. The result also applies to superadditive coalitional games which partly assumes similar cooperation structures.

Research, Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge

Article Abstract:

An analysis of hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge is presented. The analysis focuses on such hierarchies given game-theoretic conditions, where a hierarchy referred to a single player's type. It is shown that players with coherent types influences belief over other player types. In addition, the imposition of a common coherency base for knowledge restricts the model of beliefs.

Usage, Economic aspects, Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis

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