Endogenous growth and collective bargaining

Article Abstract:

Balanced growth is analyzed where research and development (R & D) uses only skilled workers, and where the union and the employer federation negotiate over the wages for skilled and unskilled labor. Findings reveal that the union refuses to accept any agreement resulting in the unemployment of skilled workers and that union strength hastens growth because higher salaries for unskilled workers increase R & D by reducing final output resulting in the transfer of skilled labor from the production of final goods to R & D.

Analysis, Industrial research, Economic development

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Strike ballots as a commitment device

Article Abstract:

Strike ballots can be seen as part of a model of negotiations between companies and labor unions over wage rises, where non-cooperation has arisen. Companies information about their revenues may be private. Labor unions can prevent companies from rejecting wage demands by making it expensive to do so. Ballots can allow strike threats to gain credibility and they can function as a device encouraging commitment, allowing labor unions to strike at times when otherwise employee support might be difficult to achieve.

Strike votes

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The centralization of wage bargaining, investment, and technological change

Article Abstract:

Collective bargaining can affect growth and investment levels where companies buy intermediate goods from one another, and where technological change results from learning-by-investment. Bargaining at local or central level can be associated with increased employment, growth and investment, compared to medium level bargaining. This increased growth can occur if there is neither high nor low substitution elasticity between intermediate outputs and labor.

Technological innovations

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