Partial revelation with rational expectations

Article Abstract:

A model is developed where partial revelation with rational expectation leads to an equilibrium in an economy. The equilibrium is developed from the action of the players, whose response to the partial revelation or information asymmetry, opens up a permutation of potential reactions which follow a utility function. This results in an equilibrium price which is the result of the smooth function of the joint signals from each of the players.

Research, Economic research, Information theory, Equilibrium (Economics), Information theory in economics

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Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games

Article Abstract:

The unique subgame-perfect outcome of Rubinstein's bargaining game can show an efficient agreement between players when strategies in a symmetric game fulfill an evolutionary stability requirement. Moreover, the ability to change roles and the ability to offer a valuable share of surplus to a rival determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's model. Furthermore, any part of the surplus can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Game theory

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