Fair imposition
Article Abstract:
A new mechanism-design problem called 'fair imposition' is introduced. In this setting a center wishes to fairly allocate tasks among a set of agents whose cost structures are known only to them and thus would not reveal their true costs without appropriate incentives
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Models
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
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Contractual distortions in a market with frictions
Article Abstract:
Contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions is analyzed with discounting and additive search costs. It is observed that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agentsE utilities.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Analysis, Financial markets
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
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Subjects list: United States, Forecasts and trends, Market trend/market analysis, Cost (Economics), Costs (Economics)
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