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Far-sightedness and the voting paradox

Article Abstract:

The Rubinstein voting game model sets a solution concept called a 'stability set' as a resolution of the voting paradox. However, this resolution is negated by imperfect conditions of farsightedness, which include myopic voters who ignore farsightedness in others and the failure to evaluate other future events. To resolve these problems, a 'consistent' farsightedness model has been developed which shows the inability of farsightedness to guarantee stability for the voting problem beyond core predictions.

Author: Chakravorti, Bhaskar
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1999
Decision-making, Decision making, Game theory

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On the invariance of a mean voter theorem

Article Abstract:

Mean voter and social choice in a super-majority voting problem do not display fixed properties in terms of changes in the utility functions' parameters. The mean-voter paradigm is conditioned by parameter values and does not set preference standards. Thus, under simple one-dimensional choice problems, the mean voter theorem is less desirable in application compared with the median voter theorem, which yields unique forecasts.

Author: Ma, Barry K., Weiss, Jeffrey H.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1995
Utility theory, Utility functions, Mean value theorems (Calculus)

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A simple characterization of plurality rule

Article Abstract:

Analysis of a model on elections and voting where voter and candidate number can fluctuate shows that there exists four determinants of the plurality rule which is the basis for the declaration of the winners according to the number of votes cast for them. These factors are neutrality, anonymity, independence of dominated candidates and reinforcement. Appropriate rules for proving these findings are presented.

Author: Ching, Stephen
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Elections, Ranking and selection (Statistics)

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Subjects list: Models, Voting, Research
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