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Gaming against managers in incentive systems : experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted on the development of strategic play in games of Chinese managers and students using a simplified ratchet effect learning models. Findings showed that the play pattern was identical among the managers and students where they work together optimally, increases levels of strategic play. However, managers catalyzed development of more levels of strategic plays in contextual framework than the students. These finds are expected to become generalizations for century planned economies with financial incentives.

Author: Cooper, David J., Kagel, John Henry, Lo, Wei, Gu, Qing Liang
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1999
Economic Views, Behavior Theory, Psychological aspects, Economic policy, Executives, Human behavior, Incentives (Business)

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Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game

Article Abstract:

An adaptive learning model was created to suggest a clear behavioral explanation for the occurrence of play from Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) model of entry limit pricing. Play is shown to converge as a function of an equilibrium. Equilibrium selection becomes a function of the past history of play during the occurrence of pure-strategy pooling and separating equilibria.

Author: Cooper, David J., Kagel, John Henry, Garvin, Susan
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1997
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Industrial organization, Equilibrium (Economics)

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The impact of meaningful context on strategic play in signaling games

Article Abstract:

Problems when put across in a meaningful context can change behavior in many ways. The initial level of strategic play could be increased significantly by meaningful context in a signaling game. Through a series of signaling game experiments, the various effects of meaningful context have been reported.

Author: Cooper, David J., Kagel, John Henry
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2003
United States, Pricing Policy, Models, Product price

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Subjects list: Research, Game theory, Pricing
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