Hostages as a commitment device: a game-theoretic model and an empirical test of some scenarios

Article Abstract:

Two-part paper examines conditions that are favorable to hostage posting for rational actors seeking cooperation in problematic situations and secondly, it examines the adequacy of the game-theoretic model used in the test. Cooperation is individually rational if supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium. Results support the significance of subgame perfect equilibria and of maximin-strategies.

Social aspects, Efficient market theory, Hostages

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Fairness and retaliation in a rural Nigerian village

Article Abstract:

The small Igbo village of Umuluwe in southeastern Nigeria, where the ultimatum and dictator games were played, showed that fairness is an important predictor of economic behavior but retaliation is not. The retaliation is much less common in traditional cultures than in Western societies and the group norms and values are more important than individual attributes.

Nigeria, Neoclassical economics, Austrian school of economics

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A laboratory analysis of bargaining power in a random ultimatum game

Article Abstract:

Paper examines the stability of negotiation with respect to the distribution of disagreement payoffs in a two-person bargaining game. The random ultimatum design allows for inferences concerning expectations for acceptable demands and isolates unacceptable demands. Results show that expectations vary with the distribution of disagreement payoffs.

Negotiation, Negotiations, Ultimatums

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