Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems

Article Abstract:

Two sets of stable mechanisms are used to analyze the applicability of stable solutions to marriage markets. The first mechanism employs a "now-or-never" approach which allows the implementation of all stable sets in undominated Nash equilibria. The second is the Gale-Shapley mechanism which allows a reversal factor when agents act strategically. It is concluded that the applicability of a stable solution depends on its strategy-proofness or dominance solvability.

Marriage, Matching theory

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Division rules and migration equilibria

Article Abstract:

The existence of migration equilibria is determined in local economies with fixed, non-disposable and perfectly divisible resources, different division rules and equal migration incentives. Although each local economies satisfy desirable conditions such as efficiency, absence of envy and strategy-proofness, an incentive to migrate to another environment is always present. The findings support a general phenomenon that explains global population distribution.

Migration, Internal, Internal migration, Incentive (Psychology)

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